The mMn result proved in this paper is the fact that any Least Square Value is the Shapley value of a game obtained from the given game by rescaling. An Average per capita formula tor Least Square Values, similar to the formula for the Shapley value (Dragan (1992)), will lead to this conclusion and allow a parallel computation for these values. The potential for the Least Square Values, a potential basis relative to Least Square Values and an approach similar to the one used for the Shapley value is Mlowing us to solve the Inverse problem for Least Square Values.
Introduction
The Least Square Values (briefly LS-values), represent a family of values fbr cooperative transferable utility games, introduced by Ruiz et al. (1998) .
For a fixed set of players N, a weight vector m E R '~++, n = INI, and any TU-game ~, Keane (1969) has defined and solved a quadratic programming problem: minimize the sum of weighted squares of deviations of the excesses from their average, on the preimputation set. He has shown that this problem has a unique solution which depends on the weights and has also given the new computational fbrmula. Further, Ruiz et al. (1998) have called this solution an LS-value, have characterized axiomatically this family of values and have also given many properties.
In the present paper, we start by showing that from Keane's formula one can derive another new computational formula, similar to the fbrmula given by the author for the Shapley value (see Dragan (1992) ) and called 
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an Average per capita Ibrmula. An algorithm fbr computing the LS-values in parallel and using only n operations more than in the case of the Shapley value is fbllowing. A byproduct of the same formula is tile result that an LS-value is the Shapley value of a game easily obtained by rescaling from the given game. This fact suggests that tile LS-values have more properties similar to the Shapley value than the ones discovered by Ruiz et al. (1998) . The LS-value is defined on any space of TU-games and its subspaces; we define a quasi-potential function of the Hart and Mas Colell type (Hart and Mas Colell (1988) , Hart and Mas Colell (1989) ). A potential basis for such a space, introduced by the author for tile Shapley value and the weighted Shapley value (1991), and the Banzhaf value (1996) is allowing us to solve for the LS-values what we call the Inverse problem: given a vector L E R ~ and a weight vector rn E R~_+, find out an explicit formula giving all games with the set of players N for which the LS-value corresponding to rn is exactly L. In particular, for L -0 we find the null space of/;he LS-value; the nullity equals 2 ~ -n -1. The Inw;rse problem in the cases shown above were solved earlier by the author.
In the second section, we prove tile Average per capita formula tbr LSvalues from which we derive the fact that the Shapley value is among the LS-values, but any LS-value is a Shapley value for a new game obtained by rescaling from the given game. In the third section we introduce the quasi-potential and the potential basis, we derive the relationship with the potential of the Shapley value and compute the LS-values of the basic games such that in the last section we shall be able to solve the Inverse problem.
The Average per capita formula for the Least Square Values
A cooperative TU game is a pair G ..... (N, lJ) , where N is a finite set, a set of rz players, rz = INI, and ~ is a function from the power set of N to the reals with ~(0) ...... 0. When N is fxed we denote by G N the set of all TU games with the set of players N and a game in G N will be determined by its characteristic function le, so that tile notation ~ E G N will be used with no confusion possible. It is well known that G N can be identified with a vector space of dimension 2 ~ -1 with operations (~1 + ~)(S) ...... lq(S) + ~2(S), VS c_ N and (c~z)(5) = c~y(S), VS c N, for all ~,~:,lJ2 in G N and any a E R. Beside tile standard basis, given by es E G N, VS c N, with
